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Ideology is a powerful means of persuasion in contemporary audience appeals.
Through the means of ideographic and fragmentary analyses provided by Michael Calvin
McGee (1980, 1990) and Saindon (2008), I examine the rhetorical appeals made by the
Liberty Counsel, an evangelical Christian organization, which provides legal counsel for
cases regarding “religious liberty.” Through an ideographic and fragmentary analysis, I
conclude that the Counsel utilizes the ideograph <ministry> as a superseding means of
denoting its ideology. Further, I argue that <ministry> is the ideograph that represents the
ontological nature of the organization’s philosophy and serves as the guiding principle for
many of the other ideographs that the organization employs. Further, the <ministry>
ideograph displays relative influence for the Liberty Counsel with and from other
organizations, as illustrated when <ministry> is compared to competing ideologies, such
as that from the Southern Poverty Law Center. The importance of the ideograph is
incumbent upon its utility in understanding a “snapshot” of the rhetorical situation.
Rather than attempting to draft ideological archetypes, as the initial ideographic form
attempted, this new ideographic form accepts the relativistic cultural influences and
accounts for them synchronically.
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Introduction
Ideology is a powerful means of persuasion in contemporary audience appeals.
Persons, organizations, and governments utilize ideologies to persuade audiences large
and small to adopt new positions, abandon unsavory ideas, or group masses together into
easily describable categories. Some organizations are precipitated entirely on ideological
means (i.e. political parties, ministries). Others employ ideology as a rhetorical tool,
meant to advance organizational goals in a number of different environments (i.e. legal
decisions, recruitment, finances). Such is the case for the Liberty Counsel, which blends
an ideological approach to organization building with a stringent usage of ideology as a
means of advancement.
Modern, postmodern, and contemporary rhetorical scholarship engages these
instances of persuasion through a number of different tools, methods, and paradigms.
Michael Calvin McGee (1975; 1978; 1980; 1990; McGee & Martin, 1983) popularized
this paradigm, by attempting to distinguish the means through which ideology influences
one’s desire, need, or compulsion to persuade others. McGee standardized the approach
to ideological criticism through the use of ideographs (1980) and the discourse fragment
(1990), which seek to understand cultural influence relative to history and other
ideological representations.
McGee (1990) distinguishes these terms by noting that texts are fragments
because they are only “apparently finished;” in actuality, “discourse is in fact a dense
reconstruction of all the bits of other discourses from which it was made” (p. 279). As an
example, McGee uses the “I Have a Dream Speech” from Martin Luther King, Jr. McGee
(1990) argues, it is only an apparently finished discourse because “the speech is only a

1

featured part of an arrangement that includes all facts, events, texts, and stylized
expressions deemed useful in explaining its influence and exposing its meaning” (p. 279).
Therefore he argues that prior to his 1990 thesis, scholars separated text from context; in
so doing, scholarship “no longer deals with discourse as it appears in the world” (p. 283).
A better method of analyzing a text, according to McGee, is to consider its sources, its
culture, and its influence. Building off of the work of McGee, Saindon (2008) introduces
the ideographic fragment. He defines this as, “an appeal generated by the desire to
reconstitute a single vision of society in the face of growing fragmentation (Bhabha,
1994; Biesecker, 2002)” (p. 90-91). Further, Saindon (2008) contends that “ideographic
fragments are the products of a dispersed, multiplicitous public sphere containing a
cacophony of vernacular voices” (p 110).
The utility of ideographic analysis in contemporary rhetoric is unparalleled as it
seeks to uncover the rich historical and cultural contexts that precipitate ideology. Indeed,
many in the contemporary academy have engaged with the ideograph as a means of
determining ideological movements throughout Western society (Bennett-Carpenter,
McCallion, & Maines, 2013; Hayden, 2009; Kelly, 2014; Platt, 2007; Stassen & Bates,
2010). These works introduce new ideographs into the overall rhetorical framework.
Similarly, this thesis illustrates a new ideograph, <ministry> and the influence it holds
over contemporary rhetorical appeals in a given situation.
Using frameworks provided by McGee and Saindon (2008), this thesis explores
the use of ideographs in contemporary persuasion. In so doing, I explore rhetoric used by
the Liberty Counsel, a ministerial organization that uses American and other national
legal systems to further its mission of conservatively-minded ministry to the masses.
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Ultimately, this thesis explicates the ideographs employed by the Liberty Counsel, their
relative cultural influence, and the modus operandi of the organization.
About The Liberty Counsel
The Liberty Counsel is a multinational organization that provides free legal counsel for
court cases with perceived religious underpinnings. Since its foundation in 1989, the
organization enjoys nonprofit status as a 501(c)(3) organization and publicly operates as a
“Christian ministry” (Liberty Counsel, n.d.a, para. 2). The Liberty Counsel’s mission is,
in essence, dogmatic rather than juridical. The organization proclaims in its mission
statement:
The purpose of this ministry is to preserve religious liberty and help create and
maintain a society in which everyone will have the opportunity to discover the
truth that will give true freedom (Liberty Counsel, n.d.a, para. 3).
The Liberty Counsel is clear about its organizational purpose: to minister to those who do
not understand its prescription of “true freedom.” Its service to its fellow man is
comprised of various legal challenges that seek to privilege its interpretation of Biblical
precepts, and interject them in United States law. Further, the Counsel dedicates
resources to activism, riling potential allies to its cause. To that end, the organization
pushes forth missives pleading for outside support from those who hold similar
traditional Christian beliefs (e.g, Staver, 2015b). The Liberty Counsel loads ideological
freight and weight behind its use of <ministry> as an ideograph; it explicitly makes
ideologically-charged connections in its mission statement, as to be clear to its
ideological purpose.
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At times, the Liberty Counsel uses sensationalism to further its mission. In fact,
the Liberty Counsel’s national prominence arose through its penchant for sensationalism.
For example, in 2015 the Supreme Court of the United States decided to legalize same
sex marriage nationwide. In response, former Kentucky Governor, Steve Beshear,
required all county clerks to comply with the ruling (Wolfson, 2015a). Soon after the
proclamation Kim Davis, Rowan County, Kentucky clerk, infamously proclaimed that
she would defy the ruling and refused to issue any marriage licenses to any petitioning
couple. The Liberty Counsel offered her its services as a means of protecting Davis from
what the organization perceived as a breach of her religious liberty (Wolfson, 2015b). Its
attempts at persuasion, however, do not end at simply disseminating missives and public
displays. Liberty Counsel leader Mat Staver held group events in support of Davis,
proclaiming verifiably false information in an attempt at persuading the crowd to support
Davis and by proximity, the Liberty Counsel. Staver proclaimed that prayer meetings
were gathering around the world, most specifically in Peru, that supported Davis’ mission
(Galofaro, 2015). This case, among others, illustrates The Liberty Counsel’s ability to
take cases and use them to further the organizational mission.
The Counsel’s sensational, dogmatic approach has many drawbacks. For example,
the Southern Poverty Law Center (SPLC) considers the Counsel’s actions worthy of Hate
Group status (Galofaro, 2015). The SPLC defines a hate group as an organized group of
individuals conducting “criminal acts, marches, rallies, speeches, meetings, leafleting, or
publishing” (SPLC, 2015, para. 4) or holding “beliefs or practices that attack or malign
an entire class of people, typically for its immutable characteristics” such as race, sex,
gender, or sexual identity (para. 2). Other organizations that have received this moniker
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from the SPLC are the Family Research Council and the National Organization for
Marriage (Schlatter, n.d.). Hate group status further sanctifies the perception that the
Liberty Counsel is an organization focused more on ideological, rather than legal,
principle.
The purpose of this thesis is to examine how the Liberty Counsel utilizes
ideographs in its rhetorical appeals, specifically the <ministry> ideograph. As McGee
(1980) argued,
The ideology of a community is established by the usage of such terms in
specifically rhetorical discourse, for such usages constitute excuses for specific
beliefs and behaviors made by those who executed the history of which they were
a part (p. 16).
More specifically, this thesis looks at <ministry> using ideographic fragmentary analysis
(McGee, 1990) because such analysis provides a significant capacity for rich description
of critical cultural components (Saindon, 2008). Using the framework provided by
McGee and Saindon, I illustrate the significance of <ministry> as an ideograph. I argue
that through its display of a community’s ontological purpose, this ideograph illustrates
the intent that seemingly guides the rest of the Counsel’s ideological appeals.
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Review of Literature
This literature review encompasses discussions on ideology as a basis for
rhetorical criticism, as well as an explanation of how modern ideological criticism
evolved into contemporary postmodern ideological discourse analysis. First, I illustrate
the history of the “ideological turn” to rhetoric. Next, I overview the postmodern shift in
ideological rhetoric through McGee’s (1990) conceptualization of the discourse fragment,
which accounts for a greater depth of information than his previous construct. Finally,
this literature review explicates the connection between the seemingly different concepts
that McGee produced.
Ideology as a Basis for Rhetorical Criticism
McGee founded the ideological turn to rhetorical criticism through the
examination of the ideological principle. The ideological principle, in essence, is a
derivation of cultural or political maxims that reach critical mass in terms of reach and
persuasive ability (McGee, 1978). These maxims help to define various challenges or
goals for a society, insofar as the challenges attain a societal critical mass. The principles
and maxims therein, once at sufficient mass, “may be twisted to purposes seemingly at
odds with its original intent” (p. 144). McGee exemplifies the twisting of ideologies
through his exposition of the argumentation of Lord Chatham, “the Great Commoner” (p.
144).
McGee (1978) argued that Chatham utilized a newly created ideological principle,
“Not men, but measures” (p. 144) to undermine Sir Robert Walpole’s public standing.
The maxim, created in response to a public crisis of unpopularity by his contemporary,
Walpole, helped define the ideological principle of “objective detachment from
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personalities and ties of kinship” (p. 147). Through his “cult of personality” (p. 144),
Chatham took the principle and, once it reached critical mass in terms of reach and
acceptance, used it against Walpole by changing the ideological connotations behind it.
Even though he, himself, was not a commoner at all—he was elevated to his social
prominence through marriage to a wealthy family—Chatham used the maxim, “not men
but measures,” against Walpole to “justify ‘popular,’ “commoner” opposition to
[government] ministers who made a constitutional claim to the loyalty of ‘the people’”
(pp. 146-147). Chatham argued, according to McGee, that it was one’s ethical obligation
to oppose those who made requests that were contradictory to one’s judgment of
“measures.” As McGee argued, once a maxim reaches critical societal mass, those who
create the principle no longer control it. Such is the case for Walpole: Chatham utilized
the rhetorical tool Walpole created and used it against him. Thanks in part to the inquiry
into Walpole and Chatham’s rhetorical jousts, McGee ultimately provided grounds for his
future works, including the ideograph.
Before examining ideographs as a means of persuasion, one must first understand
the conceptual foundation of ideology. Makus (1990) made explicit the connection
between Hall’s theory of ideology and rhetorical criticism. Ideology, at its essence,
becomes discursively produced at a social level, rather than personal. Therefore, no
single actor (personal or organizational), through intention or intentional action, can
determine an ideology (Hall, 1982, as cited in Makus, 1990). Instead, ideology is a social
construct, created, maintained, and heaved up by the unconscious drives of the people.
They become what may seem like social “common sense” in order to “maintain their
speakers largely as their subjects to create an overlying ideological unity” (p. 502).
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Ideology, according to Makus, is a tool of the populace, unburdened by temporal, spatial,
or organizational affiliation. The social “common sense” can be adapted outside of these
means. The nature of social constructionism is key to McGee’s notion of the rhetorical
display of ideology. In a sense, social constructionism allows for a democratization of
ideals, creating as McGee posited, the shifting ideological standard.
Therefore, in the democratic political sphere, rhetors utilize ideology as a means
of persuading others into accepting a particular worldview. Ideology as a subgenre of
rhetoric has, according to Weiler (1993), many facets of a typical piece of persuasion
(“inventional and figural resources;” a “generic” yet “unique” appeal to society as a
means of persuading others (p. 15)). However, ideology “primarily presents itself as
political philosophy” (Weiler, 1993, p. 15):
Ideology, like all rhetoric, is addressed to all audiences, but by its nature obscures
the differences among the multiple audiences to which it is addressed. Ideology
… is [also] designed to persuade, but does so by distorting reality in distinctive
ways. (p. 15)
In this view, Weiler argued that an ideology usually attempts to coerce large numbers of
people to accept control and ultimately to create rigid hegemonic structures. These
particular structures become relatively powerful due to an ideology’s capacity to define
“rational, philosophical arguments” by “presenting theses and giving reasons” that may
be freely challenged and adopted or refuted by a given populace (p. 25). Thus, ideology
creates a uniquely powerful means of persuasion to a society based on Weiler’s appraisal.
Not only is ideology a powerful means of persuasion; however, wholly indebted to its
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socially constructed idealization, ideology is inescapably a necessary means of
persuasion through which we attempt to change the ideologies of others.
The criticism of ideological symbolic expression is, in turn, subject to the
appropriate political climate. Wander (1984) argued that history invariably affects the
rhetorical situation. A critique of the ideological situation may only manifest itself within
a democratic political climate—one in which “people can deliberate and act to bring
about change” (p. 206). This political climate creates a civic space in which criticism has
the capacity to influence a critic’s perceived necessary change. Wander further asserted
that without this appropriate climate, ideological criticism and debate would merely
collapse into an entropic, expiry state. Democratic political ideology, Wander argued, is
the only political ideology conducive to reasonable discourse. In the context provided by
McGee and Martin (1983), the democratic system is the only one in which one may have
the capacity to desire a comprehensive understanding of their surrounding environment.
The democratic system, in a sense, is incumbent upon its participants to be able to
categorize experiences into symbolic expressions.
Poulakos (1987) noted that ideological critique uncovers two fundamental
characteristics of a text: the ideological (what is) and the utopian (what can—or should—
be). Further, he asserted that critique encompasses three stages of analysis: the political,
the social, and the cultural. Political analysis is concerned with the symbolic nature of a
work and how it works to solve real conflicts; the social stage of analysis encompasses
social groups and classes; cultural analysis is taken from a critical perspective, wherein
analysis focuses on cultural revolution. The dichotomy between the ideological and the
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utopian—what is, versus what should be—stands, therefore, as an important
consideration for ideological critics.
The importance of ideology as a necessary means of persuasion manifests through
McGee’s notion of the ideograph, becoming the focal point for ideology as a rhetorical
paradigm. McGee (1980) stated, “Ideology in practice is a political language, preserved
in rhetorical documents, with the capacity to dictate decision and control public belief
and behavior” (p. 5). The ideograph, as one of McGee’s most important rhetorical tools,
frames the rhetorical appeals made by rhetors that signify a particular ideological stance.
Specifically, an ideograph encompasses “ultimate” or “God” terms that signify a
particular argument, understanding, or ideology (McGee, 1980, p. 7), which defines and
explains a communal understanding. For example, McGee appealed to the “rule of law”
as a term denotative of social conditioning. The “rule of law,” as a social construct, is
“set apart” from the typical social lexicon through the rising popularity of the term. It is a
form of “intrinsic” social control (p. 6). This particularized phrase, “rule of law,” exists as
a small part of a larger societal scheme—one intertwined with an ideological context.
Alongside the importance of discerning ideographic movements, McGee (1980)
further posits that a particular term becomes an ideograph when, at a cultural level, group
members are habituated into believing its significance has not just logical or empirical
bases, but also socially constructed values, such as morality, religiosity, and ethics. For
example, McGee posited that the ‘rule of law’ might be used as an ideograph to justify
the continuance of a particular form of government (i.e. the Whig/Liberal order) due to
inherent complexity found in such terminology. McGee (1980) further stated, “each
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member of a community will see [the ideograph] as a gestalt [of] every complex nuance”
found in a given proposition (p. 7).
McGee (1980) also posited that in order to analyze ideographs, an ideographical
critic must complete an analysis through two dimensions: diachronic (or, a vertical
appraisal of historical circumstances surrounding an ideograph) and synchronic (or, a
horizontal appraisal of current circumstances surrounding the ideograph such as other
meanings of an ideograph in conjunction with other, similar ideographs). According to
McGee, diachronic movement involves the different meanings of a particular ideograph
available to rhetors across time; these movements are, in essence, temporal in nature.
Diachronic movement also pertains to the various ways these meanings change
throughout the use of the ideograph. McGee (1980) used the ideograph <equality> to
explain this vertical movement: despite the meaning of equality in any given practical
conversation, there always will be a functional and essential meaning behind <equality>
that binds our collective understandings together. Examining ideographs as terms that
organize and galvanize a group, it becomes evident that, according to McGee, the
diachronic history is similar to a “simple chronology of the situations as a device to
structure” our conceptual understandings (p. 12).
Synchronic movement concerns the use of other ideographs in society at the given
moment. These movements, therefore, may be considered spatial movements, as
synchronic analysis tracks the interconnectivity and similarity of the various usages of an
ideograph. Here, McGee (1980) uses the ideograph “rule of law” and its conflicts with
other ideographs, such as “confidentiality”1 or “national security” (p. 12). McGee returns
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to the “rule of law” ideograph by explaining its different synchronic uses from infamous
political leaders (e.g. Richard Nixon and Adolf Hitler).
Nixon, for example, contrasted the importance of “confidentiality” with that of
“rule of law;” his actions and conversations were, as Nixon argued, unilaterally covered
by a constitutionally predicated confidentiality—thus subverting any claim that “rule of
law” may have. Similarly, Hitler contrasted the “rule of law” with his assault on
“decadent democracies,” claiming that these “rules of law” were inferior to his paradigm.
McGee also makes note of the harmonious nature of ideographs, through which they
work with other ideographs. “Rule of Law,” as McGee posits, works naturally with
“public trust,” “freedom of speech,” and “trial by jury.” Essentially, McGee (2008)
supposed that the discursive production of ideographs, such as rule of law, arose from
“clusters of words radiating from the slogans originally used to rationalize” them (p. 13).
Each term in the slogan would necessarily function in an identical fashion to logic,
creating a semi-formal structure upon which meaning is built.
McGee and Martin (1983) summarized the pursuit of a rhetorical means of
understanding ideology through a presupposition of public values and discrimination
between simple political attitudes and underlying philosophical concerns by contending:
…Public values are historically material and more or less self evident by virtue of
each citizen’s acculturation to the political conventions of his or her community.
Freedom, for example, is not to be understood as representing a philosophical
problem, but rather as comprehending a series of rhetorical propositions painfully
adduced in past and present confrontations with material life conditions. (p. 56)
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McGee and Martin deduced that ideology and, therefore, ideological persuasion is simply
a means through which rhetors—and audiences—understand the series of events one
experiences throughout their existence. The creation and maintenance of ideology
fundamentally relies on one’s desire to understand, characterize, and categorize the
experiences into meaningful, symbolic expressions comprehensively.
Contemporary scholarship has developed McGee’s theory of the ideograph as a
means of understanding the meaningful, symbolic expressions inherent in rhetoric.
Bennett-Carpenter, McCallion, and Maines (2013) explained the movements of a more
contemporary ideograph, <personal relationship with Jesus> (<PRWJ>). This ideograph
has been popularized amongst evangelical Christians—specifically, as BennettCarpenter, et al. contend, Catholics—and is used throughout the religion’s system of
beliefs. <PRWJ> is used vertically in Catholic tradition through various homilies,
addresses, or discussions. To address the horizontal nature of <PRWJ>, BennettCarpenter, McCallion, and Maines (2013) examine the rhetoric of Protestants. Their
rhetoric differs synchronically due to their similar phraseology, yet differing
interpretations. For example, while Protestants do utilize the same ideograph--<PRWJ>-it holds different connotations. As Bennett-Carpenter et al. argue, Protestants contended
that due to the nature of Catholicism, which conducts a form of worship to canonical
saints, Catholics cannot truly have the <PRWJ> that Protestants enjoy. The ideograph, in
that regard, illustrates its synchronic movements as two groups differ on their
interpretation of a single phrase.
Others rhetorical critics have continued to engage with ideographs over the past
decade (Hayden, 2009; Kelly, 2014; Platt, 2007; Stassen & Bates, 2010). These analyses
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explicitly utilize McGee’s (1980) ideographic typology, examining the diachronic and
synchronic movements of various popularized, politically-charged terms such as family,
life, and marriage.
Platt (2007) uncovered the social complexities behind the <family> ideograph. By
analyzing rhetoric from a conservative evangelical organization, Focus on the Family,
Platt traced the organization’s use of “family” as a basis for rationalizing any number of
societal ills: “sexual promiscuity, abortion, cloning, euthanasia, gambling addiction, and
an epidemic of pornography” (“Focus on Social Issues,” n.d., as cited in Platt, 2007, p.
601). Diachronically, Platt (2007) made note of the reliance Focus on the Family places
on conservative political ideology. In so doing she traced the roots of the term and the
“traditional” usage of it. Making note of Focus on the Family’s attempt at creating a
“monopoly” on <family>, Platt also illustrated the effect of detracting organizations
(such as the Family Research Counsel) to describe the contention inherent to synchronic
movements within <family> as an ideograph.
In like fashion, Hayden (2009) examined <life> as an ideograph in direct
competition with <choice>. Hayden first pointed out the deontological ethic inherent to
antiabortion rhetoric. Essentially, deontology asserts that there is intrinsic right and
wrong to an action and that moral law exists in an absolute state. This definitional
exposition thus highlights the diachronic nature of <life> ideographic appeals, or, their
historical significance. By outlining the philosophical connections to the argument,
Hayden (2009) was able to make note of the historical connections to the ideology.
Rather than explicitly pointing to the synchronic nature of <life>, Hayden took a novel
approach in pointing out competing synchronicities by introducing the <choice>
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ideograph: while both, in essence, argue separate sides of the same conflict, rather than
employing similar ideographic terms, the two compete by each reframing the debate in
perceivably positive terminology.
Stassen and Bates (2010) employed a more procedural approach when
determining respective ideographic movements. Two essential thematic descriptors arose
from their analysis, which determined historical interpretations of the term <marriage>:
contractual and based on love (diachronic movements). Synchronically, Stassen and
Bates consider the term’s importance given Same-Sex Marriage advocacy; over half of
their respondents believed that marriage should not include same-sex couples. This
discrepancy between the two sets of respondents denotes a synchronicity of the term
“marriage:” some of the respondents believed that same-sex marriage included all
relationships in marriage, while others believed that marriage was a bond only between a
man and woman.
Kelly (2014) examined the ideograph <freedom> and its derivative, <free>.
Through weaving diachronic and synchronic movement into a comprehensive argument,
Kelly made note of a rhetor’s appeal to freedom “disassociated from its conventional
meaning in the capitalist lexicon of termination” (p. 646). Here, Kelly argued the
diachronic association to freedom intertwined with the capitalist history of the United
States, in which freedom relied on the ending of a program or interference from the
government. In that regard, <freedom> and <free> are both contrasted through a lens not
skewed by Western preconceptions; historically, Native American <freedom> is viewed
as “a richness of personal and collective agency, not material wealth” (p. 464).
Ideographs as a Basis for Postmodern Ideological Criticism
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Ideographic movements are the historical and potential future justification of
pieces of discourse, in conjunction with other master terms used in contrast or concert..
Nevertheless, despite these utilities of the ideograph, it becomes limited in scope given
methods and theoretical approaches to contemporary discourse analysis. As McGee
(1990) argued, the ideograph does not account for the relative influence of a particular
ideograph in a given culture. To that end, McGee (1990) posited that a discourse
fragment’s influence is a discernment of the intersectionality of ideologies, experiences,
and affiliations that influence what will be “structured into our experience” (p. 282). This
is the quality that most divorces the fragment from its earlier iteration in the ideograph.
The intellectual divorce is characterized through its ambivalence toward intellectual,
conceptual totality: insofar as the ideograph attempted to discern an ideological appeal on
a grand scale, the fragment’s fundamental goal is the discernment of discourse at mere
regional, communal, or organizational scales. These fragments are a consequence, and
fount, of discourse, simultaneously.
Saindon (2008) utilized the strengths of the fragmentary perspective in an attempt
to undo cultural limitations of the ideograph, due to its inherent lack of a “stable metanarrative and value system in a postmodern society” (p. 107). This becomes problematic
for the ideograph, because “it is impossible to understand why certain appeals occur”
under postmodern circumstances (p. 107). The discourse fragment, upon which Saindon
relies, has the “clear advantage” of “tracing the processes of transformation through the
clashes and convergences between fragments, which help to produce a text” (p. 107).
Saindon demonstrated the ideograph’s conceptual strengths with McGee’s
postmodern twist: the discourse fragment. Saindon (2008), by analyzing the equality
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principle, connected McGee’s two seemingly disparate takes on ideological criticism. In
so doing, Saindon discussed a new rhetorical tool for discerning pertinent indications of
ideology: the ideographic fragment. This new conceptual framework for rhetorical critics
assists in “mapping the sources, cultural responsiveness, and the reception of a particular
discourse fragment,” in addition to “enabling an account of motive for rhetorical appeal”
(2008, p. 111). The fragment influences our discourse through three interdependent
characteristics: its sources, the culture from which it was derived, and its influence
relative to its individual society (McGee, 1990). Saindon (2008) argued that a fragment’s
sources (related historical meanings through which the fragment becomes relevant) and
culture (related factors from the given social environment in which a fragment is created)
are similar characteristics to the ideograph’s diachronic and synchronic movements. The
fragment, however, offers a more complex understanding of discourse due to its
examination of relative influence. A fragment gains popularity through its “cultural
prominence,” or, circulation and repetition (Saindon, 2008, p. 95). Therein, Saindon
(2008) provided a method through which one can examine the ideographic significance,
as well as the fragmentary influence, simultaneously.
Using Peter Singer’s equality principle as a means of connecting the two
seemingly disparate theses (the ideograph and the discourse fragment) from McGee,
Saindon (2008) explicated the need for the consideration of cultural influence when
analyzing ideographs. Singer’s Animal Liberation was an innovative argument in favor of
fair and equitable treatment of animals. Singer traced other usages of liberty and equality
in his work to create the argument that animals, namely non-human animals, should
receive rights akin to those of humans.
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First, Saindon accomplished this through an examination of diachronic and
synchronic movements of the equality ideograph. In so doing, Saindon asserted,
McGee (1990) would see Singer’s definition of equality as a fragment of
discourse appropriated from previous sources, but capable of being continually
ventriloquized by future audiences for their own ends (p. 94).
Saindon first posited that synchronic movements are found in Peter Singer’s Animal
Liberation through a synchronic analysis, or, analyzing similar ideologies. Saindon
examined Cold War-era ideologies surrounding equality, such as democracy,
communism, and collectivism. Equality, as an ideology, implicitly connects to each of
these political systems/ideographs. Thus, Singer synchronically argued for a different
meaning of equality through the use of these comparisons. Saindon further argued that
Singer extended the previous uses of “equality,” such as suffrage or children’s rights. In
so doing, Singer employs a discussion of diachronic movement. He explicitly stated that
Singer’s (2002, as cited in Saindon, 2008) “use of equality is indebted to previous
historical usage of the term … in the Western philosophical and political tradition” (p.
98).
Next, Saindon proposed the relative influence of the equality principle in
philosophical contexts. He examined the source of Singer’s philosophical connections;
Saindon ultimately concludes that Singer “negotiates several distinct forms of
utilitarianism” (p. 101). At its philosophical core, Singer believed utilitarianism
fundamentally relies on the principle of equality. After tracing the philosophical roots of
equality, Saindon then examined cultural implications relevant to equality as fragment.
Saindon made particular note of Singer’s criticism of some Civil Rights appeals in his
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attempt to “Frame equality as a moral principle” while “not risking biological
essentialism of both humans and non-humans or the inequitable treatment of others”
(Saindon, 2008, p. 101). Finally, Saindon examined the relative influence that Singer’s
equality principle has in society through its use in justice systems and political ideologies.
For example, Saindon examined the use of the equality principle in Canadian law,
wherein many have debated the pragmatism of anti-cruelty legislation. Through the
process of connection, Saindon made particular note of the incongruence within McGee’s
critical turn away from a comprehensive understanding of ideology to McGee’s more
recent fragmented, postmodern conceptualization of rhetoric and discourse.
Throughout the course of this review of literature, I have connected the broad
conceptualizations of ideology provided by a number of communication academicians.
Given the rhetorical utility of ideographic fragmentary analysis, one may clearly explain
the ideological utility of these guiding, interpretive terms. For this thesis to accomplish
this, in the proceeding section, I outline the methods I use to examine Liberty Counsel
artifacts, which culminates in an argument crafted similarly to that of Saindon (2008).
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Method
This thesis employed an ideographic fragmentary analysis in the spirit of
Saindon’s (2008) article. First, following the procedures laid out by McGee (1990) I
conducted a fragmented ideographic analysis of rhetoric from the Liberty Counsel, and
made explicit the diachronic and synchronic movement of its most frequently employed
ideographic fragments. In doing this I employed a fragmentary analysis, which entails a
deep examination of Liberty Counsel fragments including webpages and press releases.
Also, the fragmentary analysis includes an examination of competing sources of
influence, such as that from the Southern Poverty Law Center and news articles. These
fragments allowed me to uncover the sources, culture, and influence of the Counsel’s
employed ideographs.
To address the fragmented ideographic nature of the Liberty Counsel’s rhetoric, I
followed McGee’s (1990) prescription, and Saindon’s (2008) operationalization, of
fragmentary analysis. To examine a fragment, one must discern the historical and cultural
influences that a particular ideograph may hold. Both McGee and Saindon’s works are
exemplars for crafting fragmented analyses. First, McGee and Saindon examine the
works of those who they have studied, including pertinent fragments (e.g. books,
missives). From there, they postulate the ideological background, including philosophical
underpinnings and previous usages of the particular fragmented ideograph. Second,
McGee and Saindon examine relevant cultural influences that surround the use of an
ideograph. For example, Saindon examined communist interpretations of equality to
those of contemporary Western interpretations.
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To accomplish this analysis, I examined key pages of two of the Liberty
Counsel’s webpages (libertycounsel.com and lc.org) to find artifactual words, phrases,
and statements (i.e. ministry, liberty, family). Roughly 19 Liberty Counsel fragments
were examined for this analysis, including “about us” sections, press releases, and blogs.
To uncover synchronic connections, I examined roughly 24 outside documents, including
those from Southern Poverty Law Center (splc.org) webpage and press releases, as well
as news articles.
Next, I examined the greater context of these words, phrases, and statements to
discover the broader elements therein; these elements become inherent to understanding
why the Liberty Counsel employs its particular ideographs. For example, I engaged with
the Counsel’s pertinent use of the term “ministry” to understand why that was the term it
chose. Next, I bookmarked all discovered pages and printed out important documents for
this analysis. I scoured through the information therein and I underlined or otherwise
demarcated relevant information for later retrieval. I utilized these methods for both
diachronic and synchronic influences, including fragments from the Southern Poverty
Law Center and outside news releases. Upon thorough textual analysis of the rhetorical
forms used by the Liberty Counsel and its contemporaries, I determined that all the forms
used by the Counsel functioned to privilege its idea of ministry.
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<Ministry> as Ideograph
In the environment created by its polarizing actions, it becomes clear that the
Liberty Counsel’s evangelical roots are both a significant boon and hindrance to its own
ideological and rhetorical appeals. The historical and philosophical significance behind
the Counsel’s use of the <ministry> ideograph is threefold: first, the historical
significance behind ministry denotes an explicit connection to contemporary and
historical evangelicalism. Second, the synchronicity of <ministry> functions in terms of
its ontological state, as well as its connection to other popular ideographs such as
freedom, life, family, and liberty. Finally, the synchronic connections illustrate a
divergence from other pertinent ideologies, such as that from contemporary organizations
like the Southern Poverty Law Center.
The structure of this analysis is predicated upon a supposition made by Saindon
(2008), in which he states the ideograph and the discourse fragment are, in virtually every
essence save the relative influence, identical. Specifically, Saindon argues,
Sources (relevant previous meanings from which the rhetor forms the fragment)
and culture (relevant social circumstances in which a fragment emerges) seem to
collectively express the same critical concerns as tracing diachronic and
synchronic movement, respectively. (p. 95)
To closely align with this supposition, I have combined the two respective categories of
analysis (diachronic and sources, synchronic and culture, respectively), while allowing
for a discussion of an ideograph’s historical and cultural influence in concert with, rather
than in ignorance of, relative influence.
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As McGee (1990) and Saindon (2008) understood, influence was a distinct realm
of analysis, through which rhetoricians would attempt to understand a fragment’s impact
outside of the specific context it was originally intended. I, instead, argue that history and
culture work interdependently. The postmodern condition dictates that texts and contexts
comprise simple pieces of the human interpretation of reality. Therefore, a postmodern
ideographic analysis must be able to account for the impact of an ideograph’s usage on
the history and culture surrounding it.
Diachronic History (Discourses and Sources)
As McGee (1980) posits, diachronic movements are contingent upon “earlier uses
which become precedent, touchstones for judging the propriety of the ideograph in a
current circumstance” (p. 10). Upon analysis, it is clear that the Liberty Counsel’s use of
<ministry> as an ideographic appeal hearkens to the American conservative evangelical
Christian tradition, given the strong associations the Liberty Counsel and its members
have to well known evangelicals and the application of the four main priorities of
evangelicalism inherent to the Counsel’s rhetoric. Insofar as the Liberty Counsel bases its
rhetorical appeals on the American evangelical Christian tradition, one may find the
diachronic significance within the <ministry> ideograph, especially when considering the
Counsel’s positions on marriage and abortion. The Counsel’s meaning of ministry, aside
from its basic conceptualization, relies on its interpretations of these key policy positions.
There are many other opportunities within its rhetorical appeals to discern diachronic
significance; this analysis is simply a brief examination of such historical and
philosophical significance and in no way represents a comprehensive description of its
appeals.
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The Liberty Counsel has an explicit legal history of defending clients with
evangelical biases, and connects and ingratiates itself to modern evangelicals and
evangelical organizations such as Jerry Falwell, Sr. and Liberty University. The Counsel
has taken many legal cases that have explicit evangelical bents, such as its defense of
evangelical pastor Scott Lively, who was accused of aiding the Ugandan government
with creating a law criminalizing homosexuality (Human Rights Campaign, n.d.). The
Counsel also ties itself to Jerry Falwell, Sr., a noted evangelical and author of The Moral
Majority (Liberty Counsel Action, n.d.). The Counsel’s associations to evangelicalism are
clear; its public missives and releases also readily justify its connection to evangelicalism
as well.
Evangelicals, historically, have sought to fulfill four main priorities in their
rhetorical pursuit of the correct life. Sweeney (2005) explains that these four priorities
are,
…Conversionism, the belief that lives need to be changed; activism, the
expression of the gospel in effort; Biblicism, a particular regard for the Bible; and
what may be called crucicentrism, a stress on the sacrifice of Christ on the cross.
Together they form a quadrilateral of priorities that is the basis of Evangelicalism
(p. 18).
Together, these four tenets offer a clear prescription of priorities for evangelicals. These
prescriptions borrow heavily from evangelical philosophy as a whole, which as Chick
(2016) posits, espouses that the Bible is literally the word of God. From the creation of
the Earth and the Stars in Genesis, to the dire apocalyptic prescription for humanity in
Revelation, evangelicals believe God himself divinely inspires each chapter and verse. In
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this regard, evangelicalism utilizes the belief of Biblical inerrancy (Kell & Camp, 1999).
Rhetorical strategies that emphasize Biblical inerrancy, attempt to establish the argument
from genus wherein the divine nature of any concept transcends our earthly, human
understanding and belong to God.
Such is the case for the Liberty Counsel’s <ministry>, as outlined in its mission
statement: as a product of divine inspiration, it requires that our human laws be
disregarded, ignored, or changed if they conflict with “natural laws” established by God.
The appeal to “natural law” as above human law essentially argues that God, as the
absolute ruler of all creation within this universe, wields immense power over lowly
humans. In that view, as Chick (2016) contends, evangelicalism reverence of Biblical law
as a product of absolute divine authority is, again, contingent upon the rhetoric of holy
bondage—or the belief that true freedom is found only through conscription into
evangelical belief systems. Because evangelicalism relies on intimately trusting in
Biblical inerrancy and Divinity, Biblical law is seen as the channel through which God’s
will is displayed. This literal translation of events therein creates an incumbency of God
into every aspect of personal and social life. Concurrently, any person, law, or
government is sinful insofar as it stands in opposition to the prescribed notion of divinity
to which the Liberty Counsel ascribes. Sinfulness allows for the laws and policies writted
to ultimately be overridden.
Liberty Counsel rhetoric is consistently based in a sense of transcendence from
mere mortal concern. Specifically, the Counsel makes its appeals contingent upon an
understanding of “natural law:”
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Natural laws are laws that transcend time, cultures, and political institutions. The
Declaration of Independence recognizes those laws as appeals contingent upon
nature’s God. The first rights recognized by the First Amendment of the United
States Constitution are the freedom of religion and speech. Liberty Counsel
advances these liberties on behalf of students, teachers, parents, pastors, churches,
and individuals in their homes, at work, and in public spaces (Liberty Counsel,
n.d.a, para. 6-7).
Liberty Counsel’s arguments rely on a particularly religious interpretation of “natural
laws,” defined not in scientific terms, but through culturally normative sentiments:
marriage as a bond between one man and one woman, or, the “right to life” for all
persons (including fetuses; Liberty Counsel, n.d.a).
In arguing for its precise interpretation of the “correct” nature of being as the
Liberty Counsel (n.d.a) had , the key term upon which its entire argument is contingent is
the appeal to transcendence. The Liberty Counsel argues that in order to experience true
freedom, one must drop aberrant behavior or beliefs and join with its cause—whether
through volunteerism or litigation—and bond oneself with the evangelical interpretation
of society. This “holy bondage” rhetorical strategy is common in evangelical appeals,
such as with the Southern Baptist Convention, that argue the only way to experience a
truly worthwhile existence is through its strict interpretations (Chick, 2016, p. 13). To the
extent that the Liberty Counsel employs this rhetorical strategy, it seems evident that the
Counsel heavily relies on the quixotic and paradoxical assertion that true freedom only
comes from subservience to a hardline ideology, which employs distinctly axiological
ideographs to determine a “correct” outcome for potential events.
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The actions taken by the Liberty Counsel in the name of its ideological pursuits
illustrate a profound sense of evangelicalism. The Counsel repeatedly presents its interest
in fulfilling these priorities through its consistent negative appraisals of actions with
which it disagrees. For example:

Just as the Creator God set into motion the laws of physics, He established moral
laws that reflect His love and justice and lead to true freedom. Liberty Counsel
promotes measures to strengthen natural marriage and the family. We speak the
truth in love, and promote positive family values, so that future generations will
reject the lie that harmful behavior is normal or healthy (Liberty Counsel, n.d.a,
para. 12-13).
Additionally, the Counsel in its public appeals to supporters refers to the “cold brutality”
of abortion (Staver, 2016b, para. 6) that exists in a reality where Planned Parenthood
condones the “killing innocent children” (para. 2) in “death camps” (Staver, 2016c,
headline), or when impugning its adversarial organizations. Within these different
appeals, the Liberty Counsel bases its negative appraisal of certain behaviors on Biblical
prescription. In the Counsel’s opinion, the Bible clearly condemns certain behaviors, such
as homosexuality (Slick, n.d.) and abortion (Turner, n.d.). Simultaneously its
commitment to Biblicism bolsters its prescription of religious liberty (Bigalke, n.d.).
The Counsel also notes the importance of “Change Therapy,” which has the
ultimate goal of changing a person’s sexuality from homosexual to heterosexual. In the
defense of change therapy, The Liberty Counsel notes potential irreparable harm to
families and patients if no access to this therapy exists:
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A requested ban on all so-called “Change Therapy” puts families, teens, and
counselors on the wrong side of the law. The proposal would prohibit counselors
from providing and clients from receiving any counsel seeking to change, reduce,
or eliminate unwanted same-sex sexual attractions, behavior, or identity.

This suggested regulatory action would mean that counselors could only affirm
unwanted same-sex attractions as normal, despite the fact that the client does not
want to act on such feelings. Depriving minors and families from beneficial
counsel will cause significant harm to them. (LC Staff, 2016, para. 3-4).
Throughout appraisals such as these, the Counsel repeatedly appeals to its audience to
follow the tenets of evangelicalism. Specifically, the Counsel tells followers to act
according to their faith (Liberty Counsel, 2016a), thus predicating political activism on
the name of evangelicalism. The Counsel also makes specific note of the importance of
Jesus’ death on the cross (Staver, 2015a), elaborating its conviction to crucicentrism.
Further, it appeals to the Biblical foundation of “natural laws” (Liberty Counsel, n.d.a).
Coincidentally, these “natural laws” are created by God, and illustrate clear reasons for
conversionism, since the prescriptive evangelical interpretation of the Bible makes clear
that the only way to experience true freedom is through following these natural laws.
The Counsel repeatedly supplements its appeals to <ministry> diachronically by
returning to three of the essential pillars of evangelical ministry: conversionism, activism,
and Biblicism. Conversionism manifests as the repeated chastisement of “unjust” actions
in contrast to those laws supplied by God (i.e. “Natural and Revealed Laws”; Staver,
2016a, para. 6). The Counsel argues that those who are on the wrong side of God’s law
must repent immediately. In regards to its activism, the Counsel proudly admits that it
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“has no choice but to resist an unjust law” (para. 6); therefore, it concurrently admits that
it lives the organization’s interpretation of Biblical scripture—in similar fashion as the
principle. The censure further applies through its appeals to biblicism: actions that
disagree with the Counsel’s mission are in “direct conflict with the Natural and Revealed
Law” (para. 6), are worthy of becoming embroiled in conflict themselves.
The Counsel further explicitly appeals to a superseding presence within its
mission. In this instance, given its evangelical mission, the superseding presence to which
the Counsel associates is the Almighty: “The Lord has restored [Davis] in ways she
couldn’t have imagined!”, and “…we have no choice but to resist an unjust law,
particularly one that will force us to participate in acts that directly conflict with the
Natural and Revealed Law” (para. 6). The Liberty Counsel achieves diachronic
association by appealing to the evangelical tenets of Biblicism and activism. It grounds
the positivity it associates to Davis’ resistance in quasi-archaic interpretations of Biblical
commands (i.e. Romans 1:28, “God gave them over to a depraved mind”). Ultimately,
and based on Biblical commands, the Counsel recommends activism by publicly rallying
against rulings such as Obergefell v. Hodges, the Supreme Court decision through which
marriage equality was made law at the federal level, and in favor of resistors such as
Davis.
The Liberty Counsel aggressively makes these appeals in response to progression
in American social customs. As evidenced here, the organization takes great effort to
persuade its evangelical audience into supporting its positions (e.g. heteronormativity,
anti-abortion, pro-discrimination workplace policies). The blatantly evangelical rhetoric
used by the Liberty Counsel, regarding the true nature of the family, signifies the
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“harmful” nature of supposed aberrant sexual behavior. The Counsel believes that,
because the same-sex, polygamous, or unconventional forms of marriage stand in
opposition to its weighty prescription of faith-based “natural law” as characterized by
“the Creator,” the United States and its populace have strayed from holiness. Ultimately,
if the country were to follow this path, the United States would be slated for
extermination due to God’s wrath (Barber, 2012).
Interestingly, while some attempt to paint the organization as conservative
(Joachim, 2014), I argue these appeals more closely align to an appeal toward regression.
Rather than using its platform to disseminate the message of conservatism (i.e. “Progress
stops here, no further!”), the Counsel actively encourages its audiences to petition for
laws and policy to remove any semblance of progression and return to positions of years
past (e.g. heteronormativity, overturning Roe v. Wade, pro-discrimination workplace
policies).
For example, the Liberty Counsel’s <ministry> called the organization to defend
the Religious Liberty Accommodations Act passed by the Mississippi state government.
The Counsel lavishly praised the state for its “protection” of
…Marriage-related industries, adoptions, churches and pastors, businesses with
private facilities like restrooms and lockers, employer grooming standards,
expressive activity of state employees, and permits clerks and others to recuse
themselves from performing marriages or issuing licenses. (Liberty Counsel,
2016b, para. 2)
Counsel chairman, Mat Staver, further praised the law, saying:
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The Religious Liberty Accommodations Act is a positive step toward protecting
the constitutional rights of pastors and religious organizations. I encourage
Governor Bryant to sign the bill. We must protect the religious freedoms of all
people. (Staver, 2016, as cited in Liberty Counsel, 2016b, para. 3)
Contemporaries to the Liberty Counsel, such as the Human Rights Campaign, have
described the bill by making note of its harmful allowance of,
Discrimination against lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT)
Mississippians in some of the most important aspects of their lives, including at
work, at schools, in their family life, and more (Metzger, 2016).
The Counsel returns to its adherence to <ministry>, natural law, and the evangelical tenet
of conversionism in the above remarks. Through its prioritization of heteronormative
ministry, the Counsel is led to praise the specific policy measures that agree with their
particular ideology.
Interestingly, the Counsel even argues for a comparison of Kim Davis, Rowan
County, Kentucky Clerk to Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. for their proposed similarities in
“principled resistance,” asserting:
Dr. King was a highly principled man and firmly held to his convictions until his
timely death. Today, Kentucky Clerk Kim Davis stands as an example to all of us
as a person of conviction who was jailed for her principled resistance to an unjust
law. Yet, the Lord has restored her in ways she couldn’t have imagined! While no
one wants conflict, we have no choice but to resist an unjust law, particularly one
that will force us to participate in acts that directly conflict with the Natural and
Revealed Law (Staver, 2016a, para. 6).
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Here, the Counsel explicitly praises Mrs. Davis through a comparison to Dr. King’s
principled protests against racism in the Civil Rights era by making note of Davis’
biblical conviction. She followed the Counsel’s typified version of biblicism, thus
earning praise. Furthermore, she conducted activism in the name of evangelicalism by
opposing the law on principle and refusing to sign any marriage licenses under the new
limits of federal marriage law.
Remarkably (and expectedly), the Counsel made no concurrently explicit
proclamation denying any irony within comparing a progressive principled resistance (to
include others in equal social privilege), to that of a regressive principled resistance (to
preclude others from equal social privilege). On the (ironically) equal ground upon which
the Liberty Counsel places both Davis and King, her social position becomes more
dignified than before, thanks to a comparison to Dr. King’s social near deification. If the
Counsel can argue that the two actors’ goals are similar, Davis, and her ideology, might
have a better social standing.
Second, while simultaneously ingratiating those who stand with the organization,
as found in the Counsel’s positive comparison of Davis to King, Jr. (Staver, 2016a), the
Liberty Counsel censures or shames those who disagree with its positions based in its
biblical prescription. This is a broader contention than that of Saindon’s (2008), as he
argued that Singer reached toward diachronic movement in his attempts to differentiate
equality from historical connotations by alienating many (potentially allied) progressive
movements. In this instance, I argue that the Liberty Counsel achieves the diachronic
movement of <ministry> by appealing to the historical, rhetorical priorities of
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evangelicalism, in concert with harsh censures with those who disagree with its policy
position, coupled with its assertion of biblical supremacy:
…Kim Davis stands as an example to all of us as a person of conviction who was
jailed for her principled resistance to an unjust law…we have no choice but to
resist in an unjust law. (Staver, 2016a, para. 6)
Specifically, the Counsel uses Davis’ biblical conviction to bolster its diachronic
connection to evangelicalism. Its diachronic, evangelical history allows the Liberty
Counsel to assert that those who disagree with its position are unjust in their ideals as it
encroaches on a long begotten social privilege. When such privilege is threatened, the
encroachment becomes unjust, against God’s wishes, or against the natural order of
things.
I have thus far illustrated the diachronic sources behind the <ministry> ideograph.
The Liberty Counsel repeatedly utilizes the historical connotations behind its particular
conceptualization of ministry. Its adherence to evangelical tenets is clear. Next, I uncover
how the <ministry> ideograph influences and is influenced by other contemporary
rhetors. As Saindon (2008) explains, discourse fragments will not only respond to its
given philosophical source but also to its cultural, spatial surroundings.
Its diachronic history places the Counsel in direct contention with contemporary
organizations that do not share its particular brand of ideology. One of these
organizations holds a public distaste for the Counsel’s ideological rhetoric: the Southern
Poverty Law Center. The SPLC devotes a great deal of space in responding to the
Counsel’s <ministry>, propagating a notion of progressivism in contrast to the Liberty
Counsel’s regressivism.
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Synchronicity (Discourses and Culture)
McGee (1980) posited that an ideograph’s synchronic associations were
comprised of other ideographs in use at the time. McGee (1990) moved this idea forward
by explaining the relevance of a fragment’s culture. In that light, I argue that to
understand the relative influence of the Liberty Counsel’s <ministry> ideograph, one
must understand both the usage of other relevant ideographs and outside cultural
influences, respectively. The Counsel explicitly uses other ideologically charged terms,
such as freedom, life, and family. Simultaneously, it uses <ministry> to rhetorically
combat its contemporary organizations that hold disparate ideologies, such as the
Southern Poverty Law Center. The SPLC, as a socially progressive organization focused
on litigation, provides the perfect philosophical foil for the Liberty Counsel, as it operates
under a similar mission, but with a seemingly opposite ideological approach.
The Liberty Counsel defines the ideographs it employs through a distinctly
conservative, evangelical Christian ontology. Its ontological prescription best arises
through the use of its <ministry> ideograph; insofar as the organization ministers through
its arbitration, it believes that this arbitration is the best way to secure a society that best
suits its ideal prescriptions of humanity. The Counsel’s extension from an ideograph state
of being to ideologically influenced values provides ample opportunity to understand the
<ministry> ideograph’s spatial associations:
Liberty Counsel is an international nonprofit litigation, education, and policy
organization dedicated to advancing religious freedom, the sanctity of life, and
the family … Recognized by the IRS as a 501(c)(3) organization, this Christian
ministry is funded by tax-deductible donations from concerned individuals,
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churches, businesses, foundations and other organizations. The purpose of this
ministry is to preserve religious liberty and … to discover the truth that will give
true freedom (Liberty Counsel, 2016b, para. 1-3; emphasis added).
The purpose of this statement is, on its face, a simple gesture toward delineating the
organization’s ministry of defending Christians against perceived injustices in the context
of obvious outlets: churches, foundations, businesses. At a greater depth, this mission
statement creates a foundation upon which the rest of its actions are based. As
emphasized, this statement includes similarly utilized ideographs, denotative of the
associations that add ideological freight and weight to the ministry ideograph. Explicitly,
it then becomes tied to “freedom,” “liberty,” “life,” and “family,” similar to the “rule of
law” ideograph. As described by McGee (1980), the “rule of law” was horizontally
associated with such ideographs as “public trust,” “freedom of speech,” and “trial by
jury.” Through the explicit connections therein, the Liberty Counsel outlines its effort to
include not just the organization’s ontological goal—to be evangelical in nature—but
also the perceived truthfulness and values through which the Counsel believes ministry
will be successful.
As with its synchronic connection to other ideographs, the <ministry> ideograph
also calls for an examination of the Liberty Counsel’s antagonistic relationship with the
Southern Poverty Law Center to determine its cultural influence. In addition to labeling
the organization as a hate-group, the SPLC frequently reacts to the various missives that
the Liberty Counsel releases. For example, the SPLC acknowledges the support that
Liberty Counsel administration members have for less-than-savory causes:
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[Mat Staver, Chair of the Liberty Counsel] has also supported the criminalization
of homosexuality both in the U.S. and in other countries, stating in one
instance that Malawi’s anti-homosexuality laws were in its “own best interests”
after the U.S. reportedly withheld monetary aid to the country because of its
efforts to outlaw homosexuality (“Liberty Counsel,” n.d., para. 13).
Herein, the SPLC aggressively attempts to counteract the evangelical appeals from the
Liberty Counsel with a more progressive appeal:
Like other anti-gay groups, Liberty Counsel argues that hate crime laws are
“actually ‘thought crimes’ laws that violate the right to freedom and of
conscience” — an opinion rejected by the Supreme Court. In fact, the laws raise
penalties for crimes already on the books — assault, murder and so on — that
were motivated by hatred of people based on their sexual orientation. They do
not, and could not under the Constitution, punish people for voicing opinions (“18
anti-gay hate groups…”, n.d., para. 74).
The SPLC makes its distinctly progressive—in contrast to the Counsel’s regressive—
appeal through its obvious logical progression. In essence, the SPLC argues that,
“Because the Constitution of the United States contends that the government cannot
regulate opinions, and because hate crimes only exacerbate penalties for otherwise listed
crimes, hate crimes cannot be thought crimes.” The deductive conclusion inherent in the
SPLC’s statement against the Counsel evidences the philosophical divide between the
two organizations.
Further, on behalf of its ministerial efforts, the Liberty Counsel has actively
utilized its legal resources before numerous federal jurisdictions in attempts to influence
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its audience, or, the United States population. The Counsel boasts its activity in federal
and state courts, scoring victories across the United States (Liberty Counsel, n.d.b). The
Counsel also files numerous amicus curiae briefs in Supreme Court cases. For example,
in a brief filed for Greece v. Galloway and Stephens, the Counsel petitioned the Court to
abandon a case regarding the public acknowledgement of religion (“Greece v. Galloway
and Stephens Amicus Curiae,” 2013). As a consequence, the evangelicalism upon which
the Counsel predicates its espoused beliefs is added to the fray in an attempt to create a
persuasive appeal on a grand scale.
Whereas McGee’s original supposition of synchronicity of an ideograph spoke to
its similarity and dissimilarity in the context of other ideographs, I argue that
understanding the fragmented culture behind <ministry> allows for a greater depth of
synchronic meaning. For example, while the Liberty Counsel may, through its ministerial
approach to legal counsel, argue within a court hearing that human law should follow
biblically outlined precepts, a contemporary detractor, such as the Southern Poverty Law
Center, may argue that such a ministerial approach oppresses those who do not share the
same—or even similarly structured—beliefs.
In fact, the SPLC outwardly antagonizes the Liberty Counsel for its social and
political positions. For example, the SPLC chided,
With the expansion of equal rights for LGBT people, especially, the Liberty
Counsel has come into their own, working to attempt to ensure that Christians can
continue to engage in anti-LGBT discrimination in places of business under the
guise of “religious liberty” (“Liberty Counsel,” n.d., para. 11).
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Here, the SPLC directly confronts the rhetorical appeals employed by the Liberty
Counsel, in a sense labeling these appeals as disingenuous at best. The SPLC argues here
that the Liberty Counsel’s ontological basis is not to minister, but to subjugate or oppress
(or be subjugated against or oppressed). Essentially, the SPLC is publicly acknowledging
the undesirability of discrimination for a marginalized group.
Naturally, an organization that is as ideologically and discursively charged as the
Liberty Counsel answers these direct claims. They confront the cultural and ideological
precedents upon which the Southern Poverty Law Center relies when contending:
Logically, a “hate group” should be defined as one whose members (1) actually
say that they hate a particular group of people; and/or (2) engage in or condone
violence or other illegal activity toward such a group. The SPLC, however, uses
much broader criteria for defining “hate groups,” and criteria which can vary
depending on which of fourteen categories of “hate groups” you are looking at ranging from “Neo-Nazi” to “Black Separatist” to “Radical Traditional
Catholicism.” These criteria are entirely subjective and largely ideological
(Liberty Counsel, 2015, para. 5-6).
The Liberty Counsel, in defensive measure, subjectifies the criteria through which the
Southern Poverty Law Center (perceivably) unfairly qualifies hate groups. It explicitly
moralizes the issue and points out the incongruence (and possible hypocrisy) behind an
inherently ideological organization illuminating the flaws of another ideologically-driven
organization.
Thanks to the Counsel’s pushback against the “hate group” moniker, it helps
ideological supporters to understand the versatility of its particular variety of ministry.
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The cultural significance of an ideograph helps to both elaborate upon its historical
philosophical leanings in addition to its responsiveness to other discourses in
contemporary culture (Saindon, 2008). In this case study, the <ministry> ideograph
elaborates upon the evangelical history upon which it is founded, as well as its response
to, and responses from, other rhetors. To accomplish this, the Liberty Counsel attempts to
alter the image created by the SPLC by using its hate group status as a rallying cry. The
Counsel makes its mea culpa contingent upon a pathetic appeal—in the Aristotelian
rhetorical sense—by reminding the SPLC of a nebulous, potential threat of violence
against them. Ultimately though, this rhetorical mea culpa speaks to the Counsel’s
acknowledgement of the influence its rhetoric holds with both contemporary
organizations and individual stakeholders alike.
The prevalence of <ministry> in Liberty Counsel rhetoric is obvious: aside from
plainly stating its ministerial purpose, the Counsel’s preferential treatment towards
“religious liberty” pet projects speaks volumes about its raison d’etre. The very nature of
the Counsel’s state of being is incumbent upon its ability to wrangle everyone—including
dissenters—into submission through binding litigation. Ministry itself is a tenuous
concept, but one aspect is clear: ministry relies on service to one’s fellow humanity. What
is the right way to conduct service for one another? How might one correctly minister to
the faith? Is ministry conceptually intertwined with religion? Each of these questions
ponders the nature of reality for ministry. The Liberty Counsel, through its adaptation of
the <ministry> ideograph, attempts to answer these questions.
<Ministry> borrows from the nebulous mystique of conceptual ministry present in
Western culture by answering the questions many may have about the concept itself. In
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so doing, however, the Counsel, attempts to privilege its answers to the very real
questions, consequently influencing significant swaths of audiences in its wake. The
ministry concept asks the question, “What is the right way to conduct service for one
another?” Thanks to the diachronic association inherent within all ideographs, proponents
of the Counsel’s form of ideographic <ministry> are able to point to historically
significant philosophies stemming from evangelism—to conduct activism, and to stress
conversion to evangelical Christianity (usually through whatever means may be
necessary). These philosophies state that true ministry only occurs when one enacts
“conversionism, the belief that lives need to be changed”, and “activism, the expression
of the gospel in effort” (Sweeney, 2005, p. 18). Obviously the Liberty Counsel
propagates the belief that society needs to change; the Counsel’s activism stems from its
legal pursuits that attempt to forcefully convert American society into an evangelical
utopia.
Again, the ministry concept raises the question: “Is ministry conceptually
intertwined with religion?” According to the Counsel’s foundation of the <ministry>
ideograph and the organization deploying it, yes. The synchronic connections made by
the Liberty Counsel inherently bind <ministry> to a religious foundation. For example, in
its mission statement, the Liberty Counsel explicitly ties <ministry> to <(religious)
liberty>, <marriage>, <life>, and <family>, among other politically and socioreligiously
charged topics. Through the use of each ideograph, the Counsel also explicitly creates a
typology for appropriate ministry (i.e. “This is what appropriate ministry will look like”):
an appropriate minister will focus on religious freedom, be against abortion in all
circumstances, and propagate the idea that marriage is between one man and one woman
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alone (Liberty Counsel, n.d.a). Not all ministry is based in religion, however. Secular
celebrants also answer this question by providing services such as “perform weddings,
memorials, and other "milestones of life" ceremonies” (Center for Inquiry, n.d., para. 1).
Thus, while the Counsel argues that appropriate state of being is ministerial, the
appropriate actions based upon its idealized reality are typified by evangelicalism.
Thus, the deployment of these typified rhetorical strategies must be addressed. In
that light, the ministry concept further asks, “How might one correctly minister to the
faithful?” Proponents of the Counsel’s <ministry> ideograph may respond that,
contingent upon the idealized conceptualization of ministry (as inherently connected to
religion), the nature of service is to ensure that everyone experiences the idealized,
utopian version of faith held by Liberty Counsel leadership. Again, thanks in part to the
diachronic and historical associations <ministry> holds to evangelism, one may point to
foundational evangelical concepts, such as “Biblicism, a particular regard for the Bible;
and what may be called crucicentrism, a stress on the sacrifice of Christ on the cross”
(Sweeney, 2005, p. 18). These two precepts particularly address the Liberty Counsel’s
ideological desires: it believes that, through an application of biblical ideals (such as
crucicentrism), one correctly ministers another. Since the Counsel propagates the notion
that ministry is inherently intertwined with religion, and because evangelism offers clear
principles upon which correct services are rendered unto one another, the Liberty
Counsel utilizes this evangelized typology as a means of founding, maintaining, and
deploying its particular ideology.
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Discussion and Implications
This study illuminates the value of McGee’s (1990) and Saindon’s (2008)
iteration of the ideographic analysis. While the ideograph is still a useful tool for
assessing the rhetorical, historical, and philosophical substructures of a given ideology
(nearly 40 years after its initial introduction), it is important to consider not only the
diachronic and synchronic movements of an ideograph, but also its relative influence.
Specifically, the importance of the ideograph arises from its attempt to understand a
“snapshot” of the rhetorical situation. Rather than attempting to draft ideological
archetypes, as the initial ideographic form attempted, this new ideographic form accepts
the relativistic cultural influences and accounts for them synchronically.
As illustrated, the utility of the ideograph is strong for rhetorical scholarship. As I
argued in the introduction, utilizing the ideograph as a means of textual analysis provides
scholars with a framework inclusive of rich historical tradition and broadly diverse
cultural contexts. Most importantly, however, the ideograph allows for a delineation of
the philosophical underpinnings of a rhetor.
Through an examination of the historical tradition of the Liberty Counsel’s
<ministry>, one sees that it is beholden to evangelicalism. Evangelicalism is a
particularly conservative ideology that prescribes a clear set of ideals for its subscribers.
Kell and Camp (1999) posit that evangelicals believe in a literal, Divine, inerrancy of the
Bible. The historical tradition, thus, gives the Liberty Counsel a divine precedent upon
which they base the entirety of their being. Typically when operationalizing this belief,
an evangelical will strive to more outwardly represent and enforce their viewpoint on
others.
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Similarly, when examining the cultural significance of the Liberty Counsel’s
ministry, McGee’s (1990) cultural influence delineates an ideograph’s interaction with the
different philosophical (ontology, epistemology, axiology) underpinnings of the
Counsel’s organizational contemporaries. As I argued, the cultural synchronicity of the
<ministry> ideograph communicated its similarity and dissimilarity in the context of
other ideographs, and allowed for an understanding of the fragmented culture behind
<ministry>. This form of analysis allows for a rich evaluation of contemporary rhetors
that may either support or detract from the Liberty Counsel’s intentions.
An important consideration for the synchronicity of an ideograph is its
ambivalence—or the simultaneous holding of contradictory feelings about a position—
toward the influence it holds. At first, the ideograph—and the rhetor that wields it—
enjoys real influence in shaping the social understanding of conceptual ministry. As I
argue, it answers the very real questions surrounding the concept: What is the right way
to conduct service for one another? How might one correctly minister to the faithful? Is
ministry conceptually intertwined with religion? The <ministry> ideograph answers these
questions in explicit fashion. Simultaneously, however, the ideograph does not enjoy the
relative pushback against its particular conceptualization. Other rhetors that discursively
engage with the <ministry> ideograph also change the social conceptualization behind
the idea, which negatively impacts the Liberty Counsel’s, as the initial rhetor, appraisal.
McGee’s (1980, 1990) ideograph is an important rhetorical framework for
scholarship to understand the broad, diverse characteristics that permeate certain terms or
phrases. Just as importantly, the ideograph becomes denotative of certain philosophical
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underpinnings that drive the rhetor, including its nature of being, the fount of knowledge,
and the source of values. Thus, from multiple perspectives, the utility of the ideograph as
a means of rhetorical criticism is strong.
Another important consideration that should not go unnoticed about this analysis
was the combination of the traditional “influence” section into the discussion of the
synchronic and cultural affiliation of the <ministry> ideograph. While others (i.e.
Saindon, 2008) have analyzed the influence of a fragment in isolation, or simply ignore
relative influence altogether, I argue that influence is actually much closer to McGee’s
synchronicity and cultural relevance than originally credited. Not only does the
ideograph’s contradictory sentiments toward influence help shape the organization’s
raison d’etre, it also affords scholarship the opportunity to understand the rhetor’s own
cultural and historical influence in explicit terms, in contrast to and in concert with other
rhetors (e.g. the Liberty Counsel with its contemporaries, the Southern Poverty Law
Center, et. al).
In that light, it becomes incumbent upon future scholarship to engage ideographic
criticism from this postmodernist perspective. For example, engaging the <ministry>
ideograph by means of fragmentary analysis will not just explicate the evangelical
philosophical foundation upon which the ideograph was built, but also explain the
relative influence of the ideograph itself amongst audience members, stakeholders, or
other concerned parties or individuals, just as McGee (1990) argued. The discourse
fragment exists paradoxically as a more comprehensive rhetorical appraisal, while
understanding the fundamentally fragmented—or, amalgamated, different—nature of our
society in terms of influence, narrative construction, and reality.
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Further, while the ideograph provides useful insight into ontological foundations,
it becomes incumbent on future research to explore the axiological and epistemological
uses of this rhetorical tool. While ontology is the study of the nature of reality—upon
which ideograph may draw their temporal and spatial significance—it should be noted
that axiology and epistemology have the capacity to influence the deployment of various
ideographs as well. While <ministry> seems to be the main ontological ideograph upon
which the Liberty Counsel bases its actions and rhetoric, hearkening to its other
ideographs (<(religious) liberty>, <marriage>, <life>, and <family>) offers a study in its
perception of knowledge and values. The frontier remains relatively unexamined in this
regard.
At its core, however, I believe the ultimate utility of the ideograph raises
ideological criticism to a position worthy of “great rhetorical system status.” The ubiquity
of ideology in our contemporary discourse, in concert with the intersectionality of
discourse, lends itself to this appeal. For example, postmodern rhetorical scholarship has
utilized ideology as a method of rhetorical criticism for decades as a useful tool for
discerning symbolic or organizational affiliations. Alongside McGee (1980) and
Chesebro’s (1988) theses using ideology as a means of rhetoric, Makus (1990), and
Poulakos (1987) (in concert with countless others) offer treatises on the academic
application of ideology.
Potential for a Great System
Historically, rhetorical theory has relied upon four ontological foundations:
rational, behavioral, symbolic, and organizational (Campbell, 1970; Cheney, 1983;
Crable, 1990; Ehninger, 1992). These great systems define the ontological premises
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through which persuasion occurs. For example, the various theories respectively contend
that rhetors derive motivation from their rational nature, basic psychology, symbol use, or
organizational allegiances (Campbell, 1970; Crable, 1990). As understanding of rhetoric
grew in depth, new and different “great systems” evolved to meet contemporary needs.
Each of the current “great systems” of rhetoric have understood the foundation of, or the
reasons why we use, persuasive communication. Essentially, once a rhetorical paradigm
reaches critical mass (i.e. influences or guides a large amount of scholarship by providing
a novel approach to inquiry), it can be considered for great system status (e.g. Crable’s
(1990) assertion for organizational rhetoric).
The Omnipresence and Transcendence of Ideology
Circumscribing ideology etymologically has been difficult for academe, as a
singular definition of ideology has eluded contemporary scholarship. However, its place
as a function of rhetoric is indisputable. Historically, ideology permeates through the
foundation of each system that precedes it: organizationally, sociologically, behaviorally,
and rationally. As illustrated, ideology is pervasive through each of the previous systems
as both a fount of knowledge and a source for purpose of being.
The epistemological and ontological nature of ideology manifests naturally in
human discourse. McGee (1980) posits that ideology is pervasive in “real discourse,
functioning clearly and evidently as agents of political consciousness” (p. 7). Ideology, in
turn, is not simply created by discourse of those who abide by a particular belief system,
but rather created and evidenced through the person’s lived experience. Thus, McGee
(1980) contends that ideology is not simply a system of dictums or articulations, but
rather a set of experiences that are not simply defined through—and transcendental of—
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socio-linguistic means. McGee’s ideograph allows for the study of ideology that is not
bound to simple words or phrases, but instead a rich conceptualization of historical and
cultural underpinnings.
As contended by Gerring (1997), ideology manifests in, guides, and defines
almost every aspect of our lives such as organizational affiliation and structuration, to
which Mumby (1987) and Sedgwick (2012) agree. Sedgwick (2012) argues that an
organization’s ideology can appeal to potential members based on its view on the existing
world, its aim for a better world through the organization’s mission, and how the
organization aims to change the world into that better place. Mumby (1987) contends that
even the basic structuration of an organization is incumbent upon the ideology upon
which it is built.
Examining ideology as transcendent of persons or things, McGee (1980)
considered the impact ideology played on rhetorical and critical constructs such as
freedom, consciousness, and belief. Chesebro (1988) also argued for a turn to ideology as
a basis of criticism using the writings of Kenneth Burke. Chesebro (1988) focused on
ontological factors as a basis of support for ideological criticism. However, given the rise
of organizational advocacy and rhetoric the academy has relegated ideological criticism
to intellectual relic status. It becomes perplexing, given the utility of the ideological
perspective, that previous scholars have not argued for ideology to be considered among
previous great systems. Herein, I argue for a resurgence of ideological criticism.
It seems evident that, given the pervasiveness of ideology, contemporary rhetors
appeal to something more than the audience’s rational nature, their reliance on
symbology, or even their organizational alliances. Speakers appeal to ideology, which
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transcends and influences the key motivations behind the previous systems of rhetoric
(e.g. meaning of rationality, use of symbols, organizational alliance-making). Mumby
(1988) posited that ideological rhetoric focuses on a paradigmatic shift from truth and the
fundamental components of language to “unpacking the ways in which social reality is
constructed” (p. 47). Therefore, I call for future research to elevate ideology as a form of
criticism due to its utility in addressing—with greater depth, complexity, and
understanding—the changing contemporary rhetorical environment that inherently relies
on social construction of reality (i.e. social construction of gender, religion, or politics).
Ideology, as a social construct, is pervasive throughout the history, application,
and understanding of rhetorical criticism. Throughout each former rhetorical paradigm,
ideology has maintained an important stature. Given the history of rhetoric—the
pervasiveness of ideology in addition to the contemporary use of ideological criticism—
and ideology’s already established utility as a means through which we conduct rhetorical
criticism, I propose that ideological criticism—with the ideograph as its flagship means
of criticism—should be regarded as the next great system of rhetoric.
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Notes
While McGee (1980) utilized simple quotation marks when demarcating ideographs,
Bennett-Carpenter, McCallion, and Maines (2013), among other authors, utilize the “< >”
nomenclature to describe ideographs. Thus, I utilize the same nomenclature in an effort
toward discipline-wide consistency.
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